On April 2, people in Armenia for the first time voted in the National Assembly elections, which became the debut of the new parliamentary system.<\/p>\n
The hashtag for the elections had long been decided: #Armvote17. It was and will still be used to share and collect information about the election.<\/p>\n
\nAttempt to control the hashtag<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
But the day before the election, on April 1, there was odd activity on Twitter: a dozen users of Russian origin \u2014 bots and trolls \u2014 began to use the #Armvote17 hashtag and launch manipulative operations. A similar attack in the Armenian virtual space occurred also during the 2013 presidential election, when the #Armvote13 hashtag was subjected to an Azerbaijani attack.<\/a><\/p>\n
The purpose of an attack is usually to hijack the hashtag, with the help of trolls making the real content less serious, creating a diversion, or simply replacing it with other content.<\/p>\n
On April 1, \u201cprotests are going to be organized in Armenia after the elections with American money\u201d and other similar Russian text accompanied by a fake USAID email was shared<\/a> on social media. The image of the letter was presented as a leak, which, however, should\u2019ve been perceived as information that was acquired with difficulty. The letter said that USAID is providing funds to \u201cdemocratic society\u201d in Armenia to support post-election protests and attempts to destabilize the situation.<\/p>\n
\nAlso Pastebin posted 29 Mar w\/ link to version of fake @USAID<\/a> memo w\/out typos @usembarmenia<\/a> highlighted https:\/\/t.co\/pIdEliu5MO<\/a>. #armvote17<\/a> pic.twitter.com\/R4MrFoDsWc<\/a><\/p>\n
— Onnik J. Krikorian (@onewmphoto) April 1, 2017<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n